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The study of network robustness focuses on the way the overall functionality of a network is af-
fected as some of its constituent parts fail. Failures can occur at random or be part of an intentional
attack and, in general, networks behave differently against different removal strategies. Although
much effort has been put on this topic, there is no unified framework to study the problem. Whilst
random failures have been mostly studied under percolation theory, targeted attacks have been
recently restated in terms of network dismantling. In this work, we link these two approaches by
performing a finite-size scaling analysis to four dismantling strategies over Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks:
initial and recalculated high degree removal (ID and RD) and initial and recalculated high between-
ness removal (IB and RB). We find that both degree-based attacks lie into the same universality
class, but the betweenness-based attacks differ significantly. In particular, RB produces a very
abrupt transition with a hump in the cluster size distribution near the critical point, resembling
some explosive percolation processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of percolation in complex networks is a
current research topic that has both theoretical in-
quires [1, 2] and practical applications. For instance,
percolation transitions are observed in many biological,
social and technological complex networks [3, 4] and are
connected to the problem of resilience to damage [5–8]
and therefore to the functionality of the systems associ-
ated with the networks. Also, theoretical tools devised
for the analysis of percolation have been used in the study
of disease spreading [9], city traffic dynamics [10], and the
structural characterization of networks [11], among oth-
ers. In particular, random failures of systems such as
power grids have been successfully described as perco-
lation processes on a graph representing the underlying
system [12].
Failures are usually modeled as random deletions of
nodes or links, while in attacks influential nodes or links
are removed according to a rank of specific characteris-
tics, trying to produce the greatest damage to the net-
work. The effectiveness of the attack depends on the
topological features of the network as well as on the
type of attack. For this reason, several network archi-
tectures were studied under different attacks to evalu-
ate both the robustness of networks and the effective-
ness of attacks [13–15]. For instance, it is widely known
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that scale-free networks are fragile against centrality tar-
geted attacks [13, 16–18] but robust against random fail-
ures [18]. On the other hand, homogeneous degree dis-
tributed networks, such as Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks,
are expected to be robust under targeted attacks. In
particular, they have been proved to be robust against
degree-based attacks [19]. However, there are some net-
works that are fragile to targeted attacks despite hav-
ing homogeneous degree distributions. One such exam-
ple is the US power grid, which is particularly fragile
when nodes with high load are deleted [20]. Another
example is the Watts-Strogatz model of small-world ho-
mogeneous networks since they have been proved to be
particularly fragile in a cascading failure scenario. Xia
et al. [21] attributed the fragility of these networks to
the heterogeneous betweenness distribution they have.
Attacks based on betweenness are among the most effi-
cient attacks to dismantling a network [7, 13–15] and are
particularly effective in networks having a heterogeneous
betweenness distribution. However, in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi net-
works, where both degree and betweenness distributions
are homogeneous [21, 22], a betweenness-based attack is
not expected to outperform other targeted attacks. As
we will show in this article, this is not the case. In partic-
ular, the recalculated version of the betweenness-based
attack on nodes is particularly effective to destroy ER
networks, being comparable to the most efficient meth-
ods to dismantle networks [23, 24].
In this work, we study percolation processes on ER
networks under different attack strategies using finite-
size scaling analysis to assess the nature of the transition
to the fragmented phase. Our results show that, for re-
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
13
19
0v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  3
0 J
ul 
20
19
2calculated betweenness-based attacks, the transition is
sharper than in random failures or degree-based attacks,
having is own universality class. In particular, the critical
exponent associated with the scaling of the giant compo-
nent at the critical point is comparable to what has been
found in explosive percolation models [25, 26].
A. Attack strategies
In centrality-based attacks, nodes are sorted in de-
creasing order according to a centrality measure. Then,
they are sequentially removed according to that list (ties,
if any, are usually broken randomly). There is an ex-
tensive list of centrality measures that have been tested
in multiple networks (see, for example, [14]). Some of
the most popular are degree, betweenness [27], closeness,
eigenvector and collective influence [28]. In general, when
a node is removed, the centrality values of the remain-
ing nodes change. Thus, the attack can be improved by
recomputing the list after each removal step. If the cen-
trality measure uses only local information, like degree
or collective influence, only a fraction of nodes will even-
tually change, so the original ordering of the nodes may
remain the same after several steps. On the other hand,
measures like betweenness or eigenvector centrality use
global information, so even the deletion of a single node
can potentially change the ordering in a significant way.
Given that the recalculated version of an attack uses more
updated information of the network, it is in general more
efficient than its initial counterpart [14].
In this work, we will focus on both the initial and re-
calculated versions of the attacks based on two central-
ity measures: degree and betweenness. The first one is
probably the most studied centrality measure in the lit-
erature, and there are several reasons for that. First, it is
a very intuitive measure and can be easily interpreted in
terms of network connectivity. Also, being strictly local
it is easy to compute and suitable for making analyti-
cal predictions. On the other hand, betweenness can be
thought as the amount of load a node must support when
there is some kind of flux on the network. Nodes with
higher betweenness articulate different groups of nodes
and their importance is more related to the communica-
bility of the network. Being a global measure, its compu-
tation is hard. The most efficient algorithm so far known
was proposed by Brandes, et al. in [29] and runs like
O(NM), where N and M are the number of nodes and
links in the network, respectively. The main reason for
considering this measure is that it has been reported as
the most efficient attack strategy for many networks, in-
cluding both synthetic and real-world networks [14, 15].
B. Percolation
Site percolation in complex networks can be stated by
considering that each node of the network can be either
occupied, with probability p, or unoccupied, with prob-
ability 1 − p. Only occupied nodes can be connected to
each other, thus links connecting at least one unoccu-
pied node are also considered unoccupied. If p = 0, the
network is empty and if p = 1, the original network is
recovered. When the occupation probability is small, oc-
cupied nodes belong to different small-sized components,
but above a critical value p = pc, one of the compo-
nents acquires an extensive size. At this point, it is said
that the system percolates. The extensive component is
known as the giant connected component (GCC) and the
critical point is referred to as the percolation threshold.
Let N be the size of the network and N1 the size of the
GCC. In the thermodynamic limit N → ∞, percolation
theory states that the relative size S1 = N1/N follows
the critical behavior
S1 =
{
0 p < pc,
a(p− pc)β p ≥ pc, (1)
where a is a proportionality constant and β > 0 is the
critical exponent associated to S1. The transition be-
tween the percolated and non-percolated state has been
widely studied in statistical physics, and it has been
shown to exhibit a continuous transition in many differ-
ent network models. In this framework, S1 is considered
the order parameter of the transition.
As it occurs in continuous transitions, other measures
also manifest a critical behavior near the percolation
threshold. One such measure is the average cluster size,
which plays the role of susceptibility and is computed as
〈s〉 =
∑′
s s
2ns(p)∑′
s sns(p)
(2)
where ns(p) is the number of clusters of size s per node
and the primed sum excludes the GCC. At the critical
point, 〈s〉 diverges in the thermodynamic limit as 〈s〉 ∼
(p − pc)−γ , with γ > 0. Also, ns(p) has its own critical
behavior and close to pc it becomes very heterogeneous,
being well described by the expression
ns(p) ∼ s−τe−s/s∗ . (3)
Here s∗ represents the characteristic cluster size, which
scales as s∗ ∼ |p− pc|−1/σ. Then, at p = pc the number
of clusters of size s follows a power-law ns(p) ∼ s−τ . Fi-
nally, the correlation length ξ, defined as the geometrical
length of a typical cluster, scales as ξ ∼ (p−pc)−ν , where
ν > 0 [30].
The theory of critical phenomena states that continu-
ous transitions can be fully characterized by its critical
exponents. If the same exponents are shared between two
systems, they belong to the same universality class. In
percolation only two exponents are independent, and the
others can be derived using different scaling relations.
For example, the exponent associated with the cluster
size distribution can be obtained as [30]
τ = 2 +
β
γ + β
. (4)
3As β and γ are both positive, equation 4 shows that
τ ≥ 2. Another useful relation is given by [31]
2β + γ = ν¯, (5)
where ν¯ = dν, being d the effective dimension of the
network.
Standard site percolation on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs has
the same critical behavior than on the Bethe lattice [32],
with effective dimension d = 6 and critical exponents
β = γ = 1, ν¯ = 3, σ = 1/2, and τ = 5/2. Also, in
uncorrelated networks, the percolation threshold is given
by [33]
pc =
1
1− κ, (6)
where κ = 〈k2〉/〈k〉 is the heterogeneity parameter of the
degree distribution.
From a theoretical point of view, standard percola-
tion and node removal are different processes [18]. Per-
colation is an equilibrium reversible process, well de-
scribed by the equilibrium statistical physics. On the
other hand, node removal under specific attacks—for in-
stance, RB attack—are irreversible processes such as the
evolving rules that turn out in explosive percolation tran-
sitions [26]. Being aware of this, we relate the percolation
probability p with a node removal procedure in which a
fraction f = 1 − p of nodes were removed. Using this
relation we can apply the tools provided by percolation
theory to the attack strategies previously described.
II. RESULTS
A. Percolation transition
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the size of the giant
component as a function of the fraction of removed nodes
f on an ER network with mean degree 〈k〉 = 4. Each
curve corresponds to a different attack, namely recalcu-
lated betweenness (RB), recalculated degree (RD), ini-
tial betweenness (IB), initial degree (ID) and random re-
moval (Rnd). When a small network is considered (upper
panel), it can be seen that ID performs better than IB.
As it has been previously reported by Iyer, et al. in [14],
the situation reverts when the list of nodes is recalcu-
lated after each node removal, with RB outperforming
RD. When a bigger network with the same characteris-
tics is attacked (lower panel), all the transitions become
sharper. Except for RB, all the curves seem to be consis-
tent with a continuous percolation transition. The curve
for recalculated betweenness, on the other side, exhibits
a very abrupt collapse at f ∼ 0.23, with a very steep
slope. Interestingly, for lower values of f this attack per-
forms poorly (see inset), barely outperforming random
removal.
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FIG. 1. Relative size of the giant component as a function of
the fraction of removed nodes, averaged over 100 realizations,
for two ER networks with 〈k〉 = 4 and different sizes. The dot-
dashed line corresponds to node removal of a fully connected
graph. The inset zooms the behavior right before the collapse
produced by RB.
B. Finite-size scaling analysis
Finite-size scaling analysis is one of the most impor-
tant tools to studying phase transitions and in particular
to obtaining the associated critical exponents [31, 34, 35].
According to this theory, the relative size of each compo-
nent scales as [35]
Si(f,N) ∼ N−β/ν˜ S¯i[(f − fc)N1/ν¯ ] (7)
where fc is the percolation threshold and S˜i are universal
functions. The subscript i = 1, 2, ... indicates the rank of
each component, sorted by size in decreasing order. This
scaling relation holds asymptotically, i.e. in the limit
N →∞ and f → fc, and it can be used for estimating the
critical exponents β and ν¯. In particular, when f = fc,
this relation implies that Si(0, N) ∼ N−β/ν¯ . Thus the
plot of Si vs N at the percolation threshold should give
a straight line in a log-log scale with slope −β/ν¯. As
we show in the Supplementary Material, the exponent ν¯
(and thus, β) can also be estimated independently from
Eq. 7, as well as the percolation threshold fc. Similarly,
the scaling ansatz for the susceptibility is
〈s〉(f,N) ∼ Nγ/ν¯ S˜[(f − fc)N1/ν¯ ], (8)
from which the quotient γ/ν¯ can be estimated.
In Figure 2 we show the behavior of the relevant quan-
tities introduced previously for different system sizes in
the case of degree-based attacks (ID and RD). As can
be seen from the order parameter S1, the transition be-
comes sharper as N increases. In addition, the size of
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FIG. 2. Performance of the degree-based attacks on ER net-
works with 〈k〉 = 4 and different sizes. Relative size of the
giant component (upper panels), size of the second component
(middle panels) and average cluster size (lower panels) as a
function of the fraction of removed nodes. The insets show
the collapse of the curves using the corresponding critical ex-
ponents (summarized in Table I). Left panels correspond to
ID and right panels to RD. All measures were averaged over
105 realizations.
the second largest component N2 and the average finite-
cluster size 〈s〉 peak around the transition. In both cases,
the height of the peaks of these two measures follows a
power-law dependence with the network size, also the gi-
ant component scales as a power law with the size of the
system at the critical point fc (not shown). From these
results and using Eqs.(7) and (8) we obtain the quotients
β/ν¯ and γ/ν¯, as well as the critical exponent ν¯ and the
percolation threshold fc (for details see Supplementary
Material). As a consistency test, the insets in Fig. 2
show the curves re-scaled using the exponents obtained.
As can be seen, the collapse is very good in all cases,
validating the analysis.
The recalculated version of the degree-based attack is
more effective than the initial version from a dismantling
point of view, in the sense that it lowers the percolation
threshold from f
(IB)
c = 0.3608(9) to f
(RB)
c = 0.2737(7).
But within numerical errors, these two phenomena ex-
hibit the same critical exponents (see Table I), suggest-
ing that they belong to the same universality class. The
exponents found are different from the mean-field values,
corresponding to standard percolation, but it is worth
noting that the quotients β/ν¯ and γ/ν¯ are close to the
corresponding mean-field values.
For the betweenness-based attacks (Figure 3), the sce-
nario has some differences. The initial version of the
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FIG. 3. Performance of the betweenness-based attacks on ER
networks with 〈k〉 = 4 and different sizes. Same measures as
in Figure 2 are shown. Left panels correspond to IB and right
panels to RB. All measures were averaged over 105 realiza-
tions.
attack is a rather poor dismantling strategy, with a per-
colation threshold of f
(IB)
c = 0.46(2), which is the closest
value to random removal among the attacks here consid-
ered. Also, the estimation of the critical exponents in-
dicates that this attack belongs to the same universality
class as standard percolation. On the other hand, RB is
the most aggressive strategy, with an estimated percola-
tion threshold of f
(RB)
c = 0.227(1). Also, the critical ex-
ponents depart significantly from mean-field. The sharp-
ness of the transition produced by this strategy is quan-
tified by the quotient β/ν¯ = 0.17(4), and the significant
fluctuations of the cluster distribution by γ/ν¯ = 0.80(4).
The estimation of the correlation length exponent gives
ν¯ = 1.54(4)—at least, up to the sizes analyzed—implying
a scaling of the giant component with associated expo-
nent β = 0.26(4). Although this value is significantly
lower than the expected for standard percolation, it is
strictly greater than zero, indicating that the transition
is continuous. Transitions with these characteristics have
been found in the context of explosive percolation [1, 25].
C. Cluster size distribution
As it was previously explained, second-order percola-
tion transitions exhibit a power-law cluster size distribu-
tion at the critical point given by Eq. 3. In Figure 4, we
show that this is indeed the case for the two degree-based
attacks and the initial betweenness attack. The expo-
5nents of the respective power-laws—which were measured
directly from n(s) using a linear fit in logarithmic scale—
are in agreement with the scaling relation given by Eq.
4 and are consistent, considering uncertainties, with the
value τ = 2.5 correspondent to standard percolation (see
Table I). The case of recalculated betweenness deserves
special consideration since it departs from the mean-field
universality class as we pointed out below. Although a
power-law decaying can be seen for small cluster sizes,
the distribution shows a hump at higher values depart-
ing from the expected behavior. In a similar manner to
what happens with the abrupt drop in the order parame-
ter near the transition, this behavior misleadingly points
to a first-order phase transition. Nevertheless, it is worth
noting that similar effects have been observed in other
continuous transitions in the context of explosive perco-
lation models [1, 36]. Here we argue that the hump is due
to a finite-size transient effect and that it must disappear
for larger system sizes. Using a heuristic argument sim-
ilar to that of ref. [1], we can estimate a crossover size
N∗, where the system becomes large enough so that re-
alizations converge to the asymptotic limiting behavior.
Let ∆Smax be the greatest jump for the order parame-
ter after removing a node in a single realization. The
variation in the control parameter f in this single step is
∆f = 1/N . Assuming that this jump occurs at fc and
using the scaling of the order parameter, we can roughly
state that ∆Smax ∼ ∆f−β = Nβ . Now, we define N∗ as
the system size for which the greatest jump in the giant
component is about ten percent. Thus, N∗ ∼ 101/β . For
the RB attack, β = 0.26 yielding N∗ ∼ 104. As the re-
sults presented in Figure 4 correspond to N = 8000, we
are still under the crossover size, which might explain the
deviation from the power-law.
fc β/ν¯ γ/ν¯ ν¯ τ
Rnd 0.735 1/3 1/3 3 2.5
ID 0.3608(9) 0.32(1) 0.36(1) 2.48(1) 2.46 [2.4(2)]
RD 0.2737(6) 0.32(1) 0.37(1) 2.53(1) 2.36 [2.5(2)]
IB 0.46(2) 0.36(8) 0.33(7) 3.2(4) 2.51 [2.5(3)]
RB 0.227(1) 0.17(4) 0.80(4) 1.54(7) – [2.1(3)]
TABLE I. Percolation thresholds and critical exponents for
the different attacks in ER networks. The values of τ between
brackets were computed using equation 4.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the percolation transitions induced
by four dismantling strategies based on centrality mea-
sures over Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks. By performing a sys-
tematic finite-size scaling analysis, we have obtained both
the percolation thresholds and the critical exponents that
characterize the universality class of the transitions. By
computing the percolation thresholds, we were able to
verify and quantify the intuitive idea that the attack
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FIG. 4. Cluster size distribution p(s) = n(s)/
∑′
s n(s) for
each attack strategy. Dotted dashed red curves correspond
to the sub-critical region f < fc, dashed grey curves to the
supper-critical region f > fc and solid blue lines to the critical
value f = fc. For ID, RD and IB, the plots are consistent with
equation 3, showing a power-law distribution at the critical
point (with a gentle decay at the tail due to finite-size effects)
and an exponential decay for other values of f . RB deviates
from the standard behavior, showing a hump for middle values
of s. The dotted black curves are power-laws fitted from the
binned data, and their slopes are summarized in Table I. The
distributions were computed averaging 105 networks for ID,
RD and IB and 103 networks for RB. N = 8000, 〈k〉 = 4.
strategies become more effective when node centrality
is updated after each removal step. Interestingly, re-
computing node centrality does not necessarily change
the nature of the transition, as we realize in the case of
the degree-based attacks. Although both degree-based
attacks belong to the same universality class, they do
not have all the mean-field exponents, so we conclude
that their universality class are different from random
removal. This contrasts with a previous result reported
in [37], where the authors show that an RD attack on
two-dimensional proximity graphs behaves as standard
percolation.
Regarding betweenness-based attacks, we have found
that, when the initial centrality list is employed, the at-
tack performs rather poorly as a dismantling strategy.
Also, finite-size scaling shows that this procedure behaves
as random removal. This can be understood by taking
into account that betweenness is a global measure. After
each removal (especially if a high betweenness node is
removed), the betweenness of the rest of the nodes is af-
fected and can potentially change in a nontrivial manner.
This implies that, after several removal steps, the origi-
nal list does not provide useful information about node
centrality and thus, no significant improvement with re-
spect to random removal is obtained. This flaw of the ini-
tial betweenness attack is improved by the recalculated
version. However, RB attack is computationally more
demanding, thus reaching large networks sizes becomes
practically impossible.
Interestingly, the recalculated betweenness attack is
6particularly effective being comparable to the most ef-
fective methods to dismantle networks [15, 23, 24]. Also,
the critical exponents of the percolation process associ-
ated with this attack are nontrivial, as they depart from
the mean-field values observed in random attacks to ER
networks and the other attacks evaluated in this work. In
particular, the transition of the order parameter in RB is
sharper than the corresponding to the other attacks, re-
sembling an explosive percolation process [25, 31]. Finite-
size effects are more pronounced in recalculated attacks,
this is possibly because correlations become important
during the sequential removal of nodes. Such correla-
tions have been observed in optimal algorithms to dis-
mantle networks [23], suggesting that dismantling is an
intrinsically collective problem.
From a dismantling point of view, recalculated be-
tweenness is the most efficient attack, as it is the one
exhibiting the lowest percolation threshold. In fact, its
performance is comparable to the most effective methods
to dismantle networks [15, 23, 24]. Also, the critical expo-
nents of the percolation process associated to this attack
are far from trivial, and resemble the behavior observed
in explosive percolation transitions [25, 31]. At variance
with the degree-based attacks where the order parame-
ter gradually decays towards zero, the dismantling with
recalculated betweenness proceeds more silently, giving
a misleading picture of integrity even at the edge of a
catastrophic failure. If we think of infrastructures such
as power grids, road networks or the Internet, it is reason-
able to conceive heavy loaded nodes as the most prone to
failure, so RB-like damages are possible not only as a tar-
geted attack but as a failure. Other authors have studied
the vulnerability of these systems in terms of cascading
failures using as a proxy for the loads the betweenness of
the nodes [12, 22]. From a novel perspective, our work
adds more evidence to point out that many systems—in
which our modern life relies on—may seem robust but
hinder critical vulnerabilities.
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